Citations
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Warren and Brandeis 1890 (†457)
Warren, Samuel D., and Louis D. Brandeis. "The Right to Privacy." Harvard Law Review 4:5 (15 Dec 1890), p. 193-220.
Existing Citations
- invasion of privacy (p. 213): If the invasion of privacy constitutes a legal injuria, the elements for demanding redress exist, since already the value of mental suffering, caused by an act wrongful in itself, is recognized as a basis for compensation. (†645)
- privacy (p. 196): The intensity and complexity of life, attendant on advancing civilization, have rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and man, under the refining influence of culture, has become more sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and privacy have become more essential to the individual; but modern enterprise and invention have, through invasions upon his privacy, subjected him to mental pain and distress, far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury. (†642)
- privacy (p. 198-200): The common law secures to each individual the right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others. The existence of this right does not depend upon the particular method of expression adopted. It is immaterial whether it be byword or by signs, in painting, by sculpture, or in music Neither does the existence of the right depend upon the nature or value of the thought or emotion, nor upon the excellence of the means of expression. The same protection is accorded to a casual letter or an entry in a diary and to the most valuable poem or essay, to a botch or daub and to a masterpiece. In every such case the individual is entitled to decide whether that which is his shall be given to the public. No other has the right to publish his productions in any form, without his consent. . . . The right is lost only when the author himself communicates his production to the public, — in other words, publishes it. (†643)
- privacy (p. 205): These considerations lead to the conclusion that the protection afforded to thoughts, sentiments, and emotions, expressed through the medium of writing or of the arts, so far as it consists in preventing publication, is merely an instance of the enforcement of the more general right of the individual to be let alone. It is like the right not to be assaulted or beaten, the right not to be imprisoned, the right not to be maliciously prosecuted, the right not to be defamed. (†644)
- privacy (p. 213): If the invasion of privacy constitutes a legal injuria, the elements for demanding redress exist, since already the value of mental suffering, caused by an act wrongful in itself, is recognized as a basis for compensation. (†646)
- privacy (p. 214-218): [Note: Each of these general principles is discussed in depth.] 1. The right to privacy does not prohibit any publication of matter which is of public or general interest. 2. The right to privacy does not prohibit the communication of any matter, though in its nature private, when the publication is made under circumstances which would render it a privileged communication according to the law of slander and libel. 3. The law would probably not grant any redress for the invasion of privacy by oral publication in the absence of special damage. 4. The right to privacy ceases upon the publication of the facts by the individual, or with his consent. 5. The truth of the matter published does not afford a defence. 6. The absence of " malice " in the publisher does not afford a defence.1. The right to privacy does not prohibit any publication of matter which is of public or general interest. 2. The right to privacy does not prohibit the communication of any matter, though in its nature private, when the publication is made under circumstances which would render it a privileged communication according to the law of slander and libel. 3. The law would probably not grant any redress for the invasion of privacy by oral publication in the absence of special damage. 4. The right to privacy ceases upon the publication of the facts by the individual, or with his consent. 5. The truth of the matter published does not afford a defence. 6. The absence of " malice " in the publisher does not afford a defence. (†647)